Field Notes · No. 01 · May 2026
What the Diversification Data
Actually Shows
Nicole Segura
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1,248 organizations
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10 U.S. metros
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Deep dive
Somewhere in the last twenty years, diversified revenue became a proxy for organizational maturity. The logic was intuitive enough that it stopped needing defending. Multiple funding streams mean multiple safety nets. A balanced portfolio means no single relationship can bring you down. Funders built it into grant requirements. Boards asked about it in strategic planning. Executive directors internalized it as a standard they were either meeting or failing to meet.
The shame attached to concentrated revenue is deeply felt. An organization that raises 80% of its budget from one type of source (e.g., membership fees, government contracts, program fees) has learned to answer for that at every funder meeting, every board retreat, every capacity-building cohort. The implicit message is that they haven't met expectations.
Across 1,248 organizations in 10 metros, I calculated what share of each organization's revenue came from each major source type (e.g., government contracts, program fees, private contributions, investment income) and tested whether organizations with more balanced portfolios grew faster than those concentrated in one or two categories.
The four groups — ranked from most diversified portfolio to most concentrated — came in at 13.8%, 16.8%, 15.4%, and 14.2%. The highest-growth group was the second quartile, not the most diversified and not the most concentrated. The range across all four is about three percentage points, with no interpretable direction. Four groups, essentially the same place. (r = 0.008, meaning essentially no relationship.) That result held across every size band, every metro, and every archetype tested.
The Gambel Oak finding gives us more context. Gambel Oak organizations are the sector's revenue generalists: established institutions with a median age of 30 years, drawing from contributions, program fees, and other sources without over-relying on any single one. The lowest revenue concentration of any archetype in the dataset. The portfolio the diversification mandate was designed to produce.
For comparison, that sits above Pioneer Pine organizations, which are young, early-stage, and concentrated almost entirely in donations, often without meaningful reserves.
One limitation to make clear: the Form 990 captures source type, not relationship count. An organization with one government contract and one with twelve municipal agreements look identical in this data. The question the sector often means — Are you dependent on a single relationship? — is not what this measure answers.
What it does test is whether adding more source types predicts growth. It doesn't. And among the 105 organizations that moved from financial stress to stability between 2022 and 2024, revenue source mix barely shifted. They didn't rebuild financial health by changing revenue channels. Whatever moved them from stressed to stable, it wasn't a major reconfiguration of the revenue page.
The organizations that describe feeling financially grounded, gathered from conversations since releasing this research, are not the ones that added the most streams. They're the ones that got clearer about where they were already credible and went deeper there. The ones that feel stretched are often running a variety of small programs or events, each one a real operational lift, each one requiring its own staff time, volunteer coordination, donor relationships, and administrative overhead. More line items on the revenue page. More fracture points in their operations.
Those two organizations, the one going deeper and the one adding surface area, can look nearly identical on a diversification scorecard.
Here is what the relationship between revenue concentration and growth looks like when you plot all 1,248 organizations at once.
The sector's advice collapses a strategic question into a structural description. It says what the revenue mix should look like without asking what the organization is actually built to deliver. The resources consumed to pursue that show up in time spent preparing grant applications, managing event logistics, and board and staff fatigue. They're often going toward a strategy the data does not support. Diversification as a concept is not good or bad; it's noise. Being intentional with your design, transparent in your readiness assessments, and honest about bandwidth for new opportunities will help you know if you're on the right path.
What does seem to predict outcomes operates at a different level: whether revenue held steady without a significant drop across the window, whether reserves were building or burning, whether operating cash was sufficient to absorb timing gaps and unexpected pressure. These are less legible on a portfolio review and harder to require in a grant application. They also have a much stronger relationship to an organization's financial health. But those are stories for another day.
Questions to sit with
For executive directors
Your organization probably has at least one revenue stream you built because it seemed expected, a funder mentioned it, or a board member thought it was a good idea. What does it actually cost to maintain, and what would a deliberate decision about it look like?
For board members
When your board last discussed financial strategy, how much of that conversation was about what to add versus how well what you have is performing? What would the second conversation surface that the first one doesn't?
For funders
If the organizations in your portfolio are diversifying partly to meet requirements you set, and diversification doesn't predict growth or stability, what outcome were you trying to produce with that requirement, and is there a more direct way to support it?